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In mechanism design, a process is incentive-compatible (IC) if all of the participants fare best when they truthfully reveal any private information asked for by the mechanism.〔Vleugels, Jan - ("Incentive compatibility" ) 1997〕 As an illustration, voting systems which create incentives to vote dishonestly ''lack'' the property of IC. In the absence of dummy bidders, collusion, incomplete information, or other factors which interfere with process efficiency, a second price auction is an example of a mechanism that ''is'' IC. There are different degrees of incentive-compatibility: in some games, truth-telling can be a dominant strategy. A weaker notion is that truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium: it is best for each participant to tell the truth, provided that others are also doing so. == Incentive-compatible mechanisms in single-parameter domains == A ''single-parameter domain'' is a game in which each player ''i'' gets a certain positive value ''vi'' for "winning" and a value 0 for "losing". A simple example is a single-item auction, in which ''vi'' is the value that player ''i'' assigns to the item. For this setting, it is easy to characterize IC mechanisms. Begin with some definitions. A mechanism is called ''normalized'' if every losing bid pays 0. A mechanism is called ''monotone'' if, when a player raises his bid, his chances of winning (weakly) increase. For a monotone mechanism, for every player ''i'' and every combination of bids of the other players, there is a ''critical value'' in which the player switches from losing to winning. A normalized mechanism on a single-parameter domain is IC iff the following two conditions hold: # The assignment function is monotone in each of the bids, and: # Every winning bid pays the critical value. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Incentive compatibility」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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